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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MARY IRETA CROFTS,
Plaintiff arnd Appella;nt,
-vs..JOSIAH HOYT CROFTS,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case
No.11165

BRIEF 0'F RESP·ONDENT.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Tlrn Plaintiff-Appellant sought an accounting and a
Declaratory Judgment concerning her rights under the
property settlement provisions of the Decree entered in
a diYorce case in Garfield County.
:F'rom Findings of Fa0t settling the account of Def rndm1 t-Respondent under his obligations to the Plaintiff oud from a Declaratory Judgment interpreting other
provisions of the Decree, the Plaintiff took this appeal.
To follow Appellant's form, we refer to the parties
as Appellant and Respondent.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The Trial Court, hearing oral evidence from both
parties and receiving a verified accounting from the Respondent, resolved the balance remaining under a def erred obligation based upon stipulation of the parties
and entered its Declaratory Judgment on those other
provisions of the Decree which the Plaintiff sought to
have interpreted.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to ha\'e the Trial Court affirmed; however contending that he should have been
granted credit for an additional $500.00 under his accounting and the evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is important at the outset to observe that the
Respondent was not nor has he ever been delinquent in
any payments of alimony or support money (R. 42-44,
279) ; in fact, he had overpaid alimony and received
credit for those 2xcesses agains,t a $10,000.00 obligation
(hereinafter defined) when the Appellant re-married
and the children either returned to live with their father
or attained majority (R. 267) thus fixing permanently
Respondent's total and overall Jia bility for alimony and
support payments (R. 202-205).
Appellant, in the apparent belief Respondent had
become responsibl2 to mah payments under the $10,000.00
obligation, restricted as to source ancl rate of payment
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uy terms

of the Decree to sale of business assets (R. 4),
til<>d this rather singular action which may be premature
hut to which Respcndent did not object on that ground.
The underlying stipulation (R. 3 and 4) contained
lfrspowlent 's agreement to pay alimony and support
money (not disputed in this proceeding) and a provision
that tlie plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $7,500.00
to he paid by the Respondent to the Appellant out of
''profits arising from business interests held by
the Defendant [Respondent] and shall be, immediately due and payable out of the sale of business assets of the Defendant to third parties. Said
amount shall be payable at the rate of 50%
of the gross sales proceeds until said $7,500.00
has been paid in full" (R. 4).
This stipulation was later amended first by interlineation (R. 4) and later by re-statement (R. 29-31),
each party giving and taking something, to increase the
$7,500.00 to $10,000.00 and significantly to add a limiting
proYiso to the rate of its payment which, when the stipulation was amended, restated, and re-executed, said:
'' 4. As a permanent, complete and final settlement of the rights of the Plaintiff in the property
of the Defendant, the Plaintiff shall be awarded
the total sum of $10,000.00, which shall be paid by
the Defendant to the Plaintiff out of profits arising from business interests held by the Defendant

and which profits are actually distributed and received by the Defendant, and shall be immediately

due and payable out of the sale of business assets
of the Defendant to third parties and actual receipt by the Defendant of said sale proceeds. Said
amount shall be payable at the rnte of 50 per cent
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of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,000.00
has heen paid in full. In addition the Dcfeudant
has the option to prepay any part of the amou11!
pro rided." (Italicized material represents that
added by the amendments at H. 4 and 30.)
The stipulation further provided that the Appellant
could have the exclusive possession, use and occupancy
of the home in Panguitch which she never exercised (R.
165, lines 2-12 and R. 211) and in the event the home
property was sold, then ''the equities realized from the
sale of said property shall be equally divided between the
Plaintiff and Defendant" (R-31).
At the time cf hearing the Court, heiug appropriately
solicitous that the Appellant understood the terms of the
stipulation and the proposed Decree, read the provision
just quoted and the following colloquy ensued: (R. 13)
THE CoenT: And in the eYcnt there are no profits
and he retains the ownership of the property,
then, of course, there ·would be no income with
which to distribute this ten thousand dollar debt;
isn't that correct?
J\lR. OLSEN: That would be correct.
THE CouRT: Do you understand that Mrs. Crofts~
J\lRs. CROFTS: Yes, in case he newr sold his property, then he would lH'Yer pay me, is that "·hat
you mean?
THE CouRT: Y cs, in case t lie re is no profit or in
case he (loesn 't se>ll out, ·will you get this ten thou·
sand dollars~
~Ins.

CnoFTS: T don't lrnow.

THE CounT: That \\'HS my concern.
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l\111. OLSEN: Under this provision, if there were no
profits in the business and there was no sale of
the asset~, !here wouldn't be any way of maturing
and reqmrmg payment of the ten thousand dollars, is that the way you understand it, Mrs.
Crofts~

?-.Ins. CROFTS : \V ell, yes, only he said that if his
wages were raised again, you know (R. 16)

MR. OLSEN: For the record, Mrs. Crofts, do you
think you understand the provisions concerning
the ten thousand dollar lump sum settlement~
~[Its.

CROFTS: I think so.

THE CouRT : And so far as you are concerned, is
the property settlement which is outlined in that
agreement satisfactory to you under these circumstances~

J\f Rs. CROFTS : Yes.

Appellant's Point IV says the Trial Court erred in
not ordering Respondent to furnish to her inform.ation
by which she can determine when, if any, sales of busilll'ss assets took place. This is precisely what the Court
belo-w ordered (R. 315, Appendix Page i).
\Ve are ready to furnish Appellant any records or
c1ata which are relevant and appropriate under that
order and no issue with respect thereto is before this
( 'ourt.

Respondent has heretofore furnished abstracts of
tax returns for ali years material to these proceedings
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(R. 90) alld stipulated at the time of trial that sin~,

Appellant petitioned for an accounting RPspondeut hau
made some sales of business assets (R. 157).
Most importantly, and pursuant to that represen.
tation Respondent on December 5, 1967, tendered to
Appellant the full amount adjudged by the Court trr
remain clue under the $10,000.00 award hut Appellanl
rejected the tender (Appendix Page i). Respondent still
remains willing and able to pay the amount the Trial
Court fixed.
Immediately before and for some time after the divorce, the Appellant was in Arizona racing a string of
horses (R. 163, 211) and later married a track veterinarian (R. 310). Consequently, Appellant never lived in
the home of the parties as the Decree contemplated but
neither has the home been sold; nevertheless, Appellant
wanted the Court to determine what her interest in the
''equities'' of the home would be in the event it were sold.
Appellant wanted a $500.00 advance which Respond·
ent granted, stating that he wanted this applied on the
property settlement to which Appellant agreed (R. 211,
212) ; however, the Court disallowed this in Respondent's
accounting as lwing too remote in time (R. 315). While
tlisagreeing with the Court's ruling, ReRpondent never·
theless tendered the $500.00 with the other funds (Appen·
clix Page i).

To a\'oid rerwtition the remaining facts Respondeut
cleems material will be staiecl in th(' argnm<'llt.
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POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY HELD:
[A] THA'l' THE $10,000.00 SUM AWARDED APPELLANT BY THE DECREE WAS
PAYABLE AT SUCH TIME AS THERE
\VERE ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED TO AND
IUJCEIVED BY THE RESPONDENT PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF BUSINESS
ASSETS; [B] THAT NO INTEREST ACCRUED UNTIL AN EVENT OCCURRED
l\IAKING RESPONDENT LIABLE TO PAY
AN AMOUNT OR AN INSTALLMENT.
Neither by their original stipulation nor by the interlineated amendments could the parties have made it
plainer that the fund for payment of this $10,000.00 obligation was specific and the obligation to pay therefrom
restricted.
Both stipulations (R. 4, 30) as well as the Decree
(R. 30) confirmed Respondent's obligation to pay from

a restricted source: profits from business transactions
and sales of business assets. ''Salaries'' are excluded by
necessary implication which Appellant does not dispute.
Profits and proceeds from sales are clearly distinguishable; however, the rate of payment was regulated
by the proviso:
''Said amount shall be payable at the rate of
50/o of the gross sales proceeds." (Emphasis
added.)
Hespondent was a member of a saw-milling concern
(H. 12) which could have had profits but no distributions
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and conversely distributions without profits. A partner.
ship often can show an economic gain but have no liqui<l
funds with which to pay a "dividend" or withdrawal.
Correspondingly, the Respondent could conceivably
receive actual distribution of proceeds from sales ot
business assets where there would be no "profit" but
only 8. return of capital or sometimes a capital loss.
Withdrawals from the partnership may be classified as
distribution of "profits" even though called "salaries.''
The parties' agreement provided, therefore, that if
the Respondent had profits he would be obligated to pay
conditioned on actual receipt of gross sales proceeds (regardless of gain or loss on the sales).
On the receipt of gross sales proceeds, he became
obligated to pay 50% thereof (whether a profit or not)
up to the extent of ''profits'' from all sources, whether
from sales or from operations in the usual course of
business.
There is nothing ambiguous about the provision of
the Decree and stipulation.
Both the source and rate of payment of the
$10,000.00 are confined to a fund specified thusly:
"Said amount shall he payable at the rate of
50% of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,000.00 has been paid in full" (R. 39).
Parties mav contract to confine the payment of au
obligation to a. special fund and snch method of pay-
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ment is exclusive. West v. Anderson, 171 Okla. 165, 42
P2d. 6f>3.
In fact, the obligor is not even liable where the obligation is payable from a restricted fund which never
eomes into existence. Stern v. Franks et al., 96 P2d 802
'
'
33 Cal. App.2d 676. Gardner v. Trigg, 59 Ariz. 397, 129
P2d 6ti6.

Such claim is not made here except to demonstrate
that Respondent has had no. liability to pay anything on
the $10,000.00 because he had received no proceeds from
sales of business assets as appears from Respondent's
1-erified accounting (R. 90, 91) which is not disputed.
Notwithstanding he had no unqualified liability to pay,
Respondent had in fact prepaid in excess of $5,000.00
on the account because Appellant requested funds of
him (R. 222 et seq.).
Respondent received proceeds from sales in the
year 1967 and tendered Appellant the full remaining
balance. (Appendix p. i.)
[BJ INTEREST ON THE $10,000.00

Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P2d 201, holds that
judgments providing for periodic installments under a
decrel' do not bear interest until they are unqualifiedly
payable.
Reference by counsel to interest on a judgment for
one-half of the yalne of community property is inappli-
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cable because that payment was due when the decree was
entered. Payment was neither deferred nor conditional.
Here the payment is both def erred and conditional.
It may never have become due.
The a·ward interpreted in Scott v. Scott (1967), 19
U2d 267, 430 P2d 380 1cas a specific sum in deferred installments ($1,000_00 per month for 121 months)_
The Court said at Page 383 of 430 P2d:
The right to such accrued installment payments
"\'ested in the plaintiff on the due date of each installment, and the plaintiff is entitled to interest
thereon at the legal rate until payment is made.

Arnold v_ Arnold, 140 NvV2d 874, is in accord with
our position: ''specific periods payments'' bear interest
from the time they become due and owing, not before.
The Decree says :
Said amount shall be payable at the rate of 50%
of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,000.00
has been paid in full.

It does not say "until :,;aid $10,000 together with
terest has been pnid in full.''

i11'

Appellant's 01dy claim to interest lies in her assertion that the $10,000.00 obligation attains the dignity of
a judgment.
This thesis is wholly dissipated when considered in
light of an annotutiou in 33 ALR2cl 145G where the au-
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thor, in a compendium of the cases, summarizes the rule
and rationale thereof as follows:
The theory behind this rule [that divorce-decreed
installments bear interest from the date they become due] appears to be that such installments
are in the nature of separate judgments which
bear interest as they become due. (Emphasis
added.)
Utah's decision of Boyle v. Baggs, 10 U2d 203, 350
P2cl G22, is entirely consonant with this view of '' separate judgments'' to the extent they impose the incident
of a lien when due a11id unpaid.
Vol. 47 CJS, P. 35, Interest, Section 21c, expresses
the rnlc that:
The right to interest on judgments being purely
statutory, interest may be allowed on only such
judgments as come within the provisions of the
statute.
Roberts v. Roberts, 69 Wash. 2d, 420 P2d 864 holds
that each installment of alimony, when unpaid, becomes
a separate judgment and bears interest from the due
date.

The Utah cases of McKay v. McKay, 13U2d187, 370
P2d 358 and Larson v. Larson, 9 U2d 160, 340 P2d 421,
hold thnt interest accrues only after delinquency in an
i11stnllmc11t. These cases affect alimony; hmYever, the
pri1wiple of separate judgments applies to lump sum or
property settlement awards: H eustis v. H eustis (Ky.)
:381 S\V2d 333, holds that an unliquidated claim bears no
interest until liquidated by reduction to judgment.
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Martin v. Martin (Okla.) 350 P.2d 270 holds that
where a judgment awarded the wife a lump sum of
money payable in a specified period the wife was not
entitled to interest from rendition of judgment where
payment was made within the time fixed. Similar holdillgs are found in Viser v. Viser, 243 La. 706, 146 So2d
409; Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 117 NE2d 65.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT "EQUITIES" IN THE HOME PROPERTY MEANT THE SALE PRICE LESS
ENCUMBRANCES.

It is entirely concei vahle that the home property
would never be sold. This possibility is contemplated
by stipulation and the Decree ( R. 4, 5, 31, 40). It is
here that Appellant entirely misconceived the issue. The
two provisions in the Decree, although they may on superficial inspection appear inconsistent on their face,
apply to two different fact situations, i.e., a situation
~where the Appellant may (although she has not to the
present time) desire to occupy the home, in which event
the Defendant is responsible for the monthly mortgage
payments; 1 and secondly, a situation where the parties
mutually agree upon a sale in which event the equities
will be divided.
Those equities arc to he cletcrmim•cl by deducting
the encumbrances and dividing ilw remainder. Crowder
v. State Dept. of Social Securdy, 239 P2d 387.
1

Which he has done and continues to do.
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Pierson v. Ball, 189 So. 679, 138 Fla. 104, holds that:
In common parlance the word equity has reference to the value of the property in excess of encumbrances against it which amount to a lien.

Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Allen, 261
NW 912, 220 Iowa 448 holds:
The term "equity" means the remaining interest
belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged
his property, or the surplus or value which may
remain after the property has been disposed of for
the satisfaction of liens. And" equity" is defined
as the amount of value of the property above the
total liens or charges.
Whatever disposition is made of the home will determine the parties' ''equities.'' If it is not sold the
problem \Yill be moot but Respondent must continue to
make the mortgage payments according to the terms of
the mortgage at the monthly rate specified.
If the home if; sold, the amount of liens will then

have to be determined and the remaining ''equity,'' arrived at by deducting these encumbrances from the sale
pric<>, is to be divided.
POINT III
THE '11 RIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
SETTLii\G 'THE ACCOUNTING BETWEEN
'rHE PARTIES.
'l'hc matter of interest, raised by Appellant in both
her Puints I and IJI, has heen treated in this brief under

Point I.
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Appellant complains that Respondent should not
have been given credit for payments he made to her out
of the final payment upon a home the parties had occu.
pied while tempornrily residing in Salt Lake City or for
sale of a pasture in Panguitch.
The record does not disclose in any place where the
property was held in "joint tenancy." Under an argu.
mentative cross-examination conducted by counsel against
the Defendant, the Attorney for the Plaintiff ''advised''
Mr. Crofts that the property likely was in joint tenaney
as that was customarily the ·way it was handled if an
attorney prepared the documents and Mr. Crofts obligingly agreed that that must have been how it was if counsel told him so (H. 258, 259). The difficulty is that there
is no proof anywhere that there was title to the property
at all.
The facts are that Mr. Crofts was a Utah State Commissioner of Agriculture and rather than renting a home
in Salt Lake during his temporary absence from Southern Utah where his business was located he contracted
to purchase a home in Salt Lake City which was their
residence during his tour of service for the State. His
wife's name may have been on the contract but nothing
except negative evidence it "must have been" was before the Court.
The pasture in Panguitch probably was m joint
tenancy being for Appellant's race horses.
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Evidence of 1u1 interest of Appellant in these properties is a responsibility which the Plaintiff has the burden of proving if any is asserted.
The Respondent did not produce any evidence of
title but relied on an agreement between the parties
found by the Court as a matter of fact to have been consummated, that if Appellant received one-half of the net
proceeds from those sales they would be credited on the
$10,000.00 obligation (R. 253, 257, Exhibit 6, R. 310).
Two checks were exchanged; one for the Salt Lake
real estate contract and one for the Panguitch pasture
(R. 254).
The Court found as a fact that the agreement was as
}fr. Crofts testified. The entitlement of the parties being
in doubt respecting (1) title to the property, contract,
proceeds, or other interests therein and (2) the question
of whether or when the $10,000.00 obligation would be
payable, the parties could effectively contract to apply
the amounts Appellant received on the property settlement agreement.
The fact that Appellant's name was on a contract
documellt does not automatically give her a vested interrst in the proceeds of the sale (Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 U2d
:388, :rn7 P2d 179.)
'l'he Comt found (R. 318) that the parties reached
an ::i.eeord and satisfaction on the question whether the
Decree intended the $10,000.00 to include all interests in
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any property of a community or marriage-acquired char.
acter and that they resolnd any dispute by paying Mrs.
Crofts one-half the proceeds and mutually agreeing to
credit those amounts to the obligation.

POINT IV.
RESPONDENT ·wILL FURNISH TO APPELLANT RECORDS APPROPRIATE TO
VERIFY WHAT IS ALREADY SHOWN IN
THE RECORD.
Since the Trial Court has already ordered what Ap.
pellant seeks by this point we see no necessity to argue it.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Trial Court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Def end ant
and Respondent.
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APPENDIX
MATTSSON & JACKSON
Carvel Mattsson

Norman H. Jackson
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone 896-5441
Area Code 801

December 14, 1967

:'\fr. Ken Chamberlain
Olsen & Chamberlain
Attorneys at Law
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
Doar Ken:

Re: Crofts v. Crofts

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. J. H. Crofts
at 2.)0 South 3rd West, Panguitch, Utah.
Mrs. Ireta R. Anderson sent to us recently the check
which is enclosed herewith and which bears No. 387, is
Lloted December 5, 1967, is made payable to the Order
of Ii-eta R. Anderson, and her attorneys Carvel Mattsson
1!11c1 E(hnHd Richards, is in the sum of $4,563.84 and is
Llrawu by .J. H. Crofts on the Bank of Iron County, Paro1rn11. Utah.
On the back of the check you or Mr. Crofts typed
th0 following: "Full satisfaction of J dgmt of Sixth District Court.''
The said sum will not be accepted in satisfadion of
the Jnclg-me11t, for which reason the check is being returned to you herewith. If Mr. Crofts desires to pay
tlie said sl;m of $4-,563.84 to apply on whatever amount
i~ finally determi11cd to he due and to stop the running of
interest. on that amount, the payment will be accepted and
ere di tell hut not 0t herwise.
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APPE~DlX -

(Continued)

In the near future you will receive a Notice of Appeal
in this matter. There are a number of items we want the
Utah Supreme Court to rule on.
In the last Decision of J uclgr Erickson, there was an
Order that you furnish us ·with information and data
relative to sales of business assets and receipt of business
profits. We have not received such data, the nature of
which is spelled out in the Demand and Request for pro.
duction of documents served on you under date of May
27, 1967. It will be appreciated if you will furnish these
items to us without delay.
Yours very truly,
MATTSSON & JACKSON
By /s/ CARVEL MATTSSON
CM:lo
Enclosure
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